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As device mobility has transformed a novelty into a userexpectation, the need for managed dynamic network con-figuration in campus and wireless environments has grown
exponentially. User mobility and ease of end-user device network
configuration have become key requirements when designing multi-
user accessible networks. Additional challenges in this environment
include maintaining security access controls, usage tracking,
billing, and end-user support.
To support these requirements, the Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP) provides the foundation of network auto-configu-
ration, but it must also extend
beyond the demands of traditional
DHCP servers to meet the security
and functionality requirements of
next generation deployments.
Before DHCP services can be prop-
erly utilized, weaknesses of the pro-
tocol and server implementation
should be understood to ensure
proper deployment and integration
with other services. Non-traditional
uses of DHCP to detect client oper-
ating systems, emerging extensions
to DHCP, and security measures that
can be taken to protect DHCP
deployments will also be explored.
Driving Factors
Information security officers and
systems and network administrators all want to control which
devices are allowed onto their networks, but this is not always pos-
sible. Internet service providers would be overwhelmed if they had
to pre-approve every device on their networks, especially when
many corner coffee shops offer wireless access to their customers.
Large universities are another environment where pre-approving
all network devices is a Herculean task. University networks are
usually well connected to the Internet and are therefore popular tar-
gets for hackers, but many systems in these environments are owned
by students more concerned with their mp3 collections than their
operating systems or anti-virus definitions.
Several commercial products attempt to address these issues, but
they often fall short of providing a comprehensive solution that scales
reasonably. Captive portals, where users are redirected to a login page
while their systems are scanned for vulnerabilities, often require gate-
ways to be installed in front of every Ethernet (layer 2) segment of the
network. While this approach provides a level of intra-subnet isola-
tion, it still allows inter-subnet communication and thus infection in
the case of a worm or virus outbreak. In response to default client fire-
walls like Windows XP service pack 2, many of these systems have
resorted to a client agent that allows for end-user device scanning for
proper configuration and patches. Installation of software on an end-
user system for which you do not have administrative control can
quickly generate a large number of end-user support issues.
Operating System Fingerprinting
Increasingly, security and network administrators are relying on
device registration systems for access control as well as intrusion
detection and prevention systems to maintain network integrity.
Additionally, administrators are actively scanning hosts looking for
vulnerable systems so they can proactively instruct the owners of
those systems to apply the appropriate patches.
Remote OS fingerprinting is
useful for filtering out false posi-
tives from network scans and IDS
logs in these environments. If a
remote system is shown to be run-
ning Linux, a Microsoft SQL Server
vulnerability reported for that host
may be a false positive.
Current fingerprinting tech-
niques fall into two categories:
active and passive. Fyodor’s NMap
Security Scanner demonstrated in
Figure 1 falls into the former cate-
gory. NMap examines various ele-
ments of TCP/IP packets to
determine the remote host’s operat-
ing system. Essentially, utilities like
NMap do a “call and response” with
a remote host, sometimes sending
specially crafted packets to the remote system and examining the
packets that come back from the host. Different operating systems
respond differently to these packets, and these responses contain
enough information to make a determination about which operating
system is running on the remote host.
Although active TCP/IP stack fingerprinting is highly effective,
it does have one major disadvantage. Active fingerprinting requires
communication with the remote host and, because this may include
the use of unusual or malformed packets, an intrusion detection sys-
tem or personal firewall on the remote system may detect these odd
packets and sound an alarm or discard them.
Passive fingerprinting, on the other hand, can be undetectable.
Tools like p0f [1] also analyze TCP/IP headers to determine a remote
host’s OS. However, passive tools eavesdrop on the conversations of
others and determine the remote operating systems without partici-
pating in the conversation.
University of Kansas
The University of Kansas data network is large and diverse with
centralized management to the edge and distributed management of
the end nodes. Every fall, thousands of students move into residence
halls where they have the option of plugging their computers (often
28 — Sys Admin www.sysadminmag.com February 2005
Next Generation DHCP Deployments
Dave Hull and George F. Willard III
SECURITY
needed. Enter the software engineering team at the KU Networking
and Telecommunications Services (NTS), a division of Information
Services. While developing the University’s Advanced Network
Services Registry (ANSR) system [4], a suite of directory-enabled
applications for network management, the team discovered a new
technique for passive OS fingerprinting.
The technique developed at KU has been dubbed “DHCP
Fingerprint”, and it relies on DHCP Options as defined in RFC
2132 [5]. According to the RFC, “configuration parameters and
other control information are carried in tagged data items that are
stored in the ’options’ field of the DHCP message.” Each operating
system requests a different ordered set of options, thus the operating
system may be determined by examining the options requested by
the client.
KU’s NTS software engineering team uses this passive OS-fin-
gerprinting technique to determine the operating systems of ResNet
customers. This information is then recorded in the ANSR directory
server where it can be used by RINGS and other ANSR applica-
tions, such as those that restrict rogue wireless access points or
broadband routers from accessing the network — even in cases
where students are savvy enough to clone the MAC addresses of
legitimately registered devices.
Besides providing information to KU’s integrated systems, the
operating system information may also be used for planning and
analysis. Figure 3 shows the current ResNet operating system dis-
tribution. This graph clearly indicates that our ResNet student
consultants should have Microsoft Windows XP training and
experience.
unpatched and unprotected) into the University’s network. If and
when students do connect to the campus network, they find their
access to the campus network and the Internet limited.
When a student in a residence hall opens a Web browser, he is
automatically redirected to a Web site where he must register his
computer and purchase Internet access before he can access the KU
network and the Internet as shown in Figure 2.
As part of the registration process, ResNet customers’ com-
puters are checked for the latest operating system updates,
University-supported anti-virus software and up-to-date virus
definition files. Each of these operations is handled by RINGS
(Resnet Integrated Next-Generation System) [2], an internally
developed J2EE-based registration system that contains function-
ality similar to the popular NetReg [3] system. Additionally, the
MAC addresses of the students’ computers are recorded in a
directory server along with the DHCP-assigned IP addresses and
other customer device information. Recording the customers’
operating systems and detailed network location information
allows for rapid problem detection and resolution regarding client
mis-configuration and security incident handling.
DHCP OS Fingerprinting
In large deployments and transient networks, a better passive fin-
gerprinting technique that provides a high degree of accuracy is
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Figure 1  NMAP fingerprinting
Figure 3  ResNet operating system distribution
Figure 4  DHCP packet format 
Figure 2  ResNet device registration
the ability to override handling of any option at any level, even on a
per-device basis to accommodate client-specific needs.
During the development of the ANSR system, the software engi-
neering team noticed that client devices were requesting different
options from the DHCP server with enough variation in ordering
and requested options to be used to fingerprint devices using the
DHCP server.
DHCP Listener
To test this idea, the software team initially developed a stand-
alone Java application called DHCPListener [6] that runs on a host
and listens for broadcast traffic to port 67, the default DHCP server
port. As packets come in, the application parses them and examines
the DHCP options information. Option 53 contains the DHCP mes-
sage type. If the value of option 53 is 1 or 3, the packet contains
DHCPDISCOVER or DHCPREQUEST information, respectively,
and the parsing continues; otherwise the packet is ignored.
Following the extraction of the message type, DHCPListener
attempts to extract additional options, if they are present, including
the vendor class identifier that may reveal some basic information
about the remote host. For example, Windows 2000 and XP report
MSFT 5.0, while Windows 98 reports MSFT 98 instead.
Option 55, however, contains the real meat of the fingerprinting
technique. To date, the team has collected unique signatures of 19
distinct devices and operating systems. When DHCPListener parses
option 55’s contents, it takes the list of options and uses them to
retrieve the device or operating system from a hash map that is
loaded from a text file when the application starts. Figure 5 shows
some of the entries from the fingerprints.txt file.
DHCPListener generates XML markup as shown in Figure 6. The
XML output may be validated against a DTD to easily be processed by
other programs and systems, or processed by a style sheet for tabular
display. For unknown operating systems, the operatingSystem tags
will contain a braced list of requested options. For example, the list
might resemble {1,66,6,3,67,12,-106}. If the DHCPListener oper-
ator knows the operating system for the device in question, he may
simply add it to the fingerprints.txt file and restart the listener. In this
case, the device is actually a Cisco 2900 Catalyst XL switch using
DHCP to obtain its own IP address and network information.





































Figure 6  Example DHCPListener output
How DHCP OS Fingerprinting Works
DHCP options are used by DHCP clients to request additional infor-
mation from the DHCP server. Each option is identified by a unique
code or “tag octet”. Figure 4 shows the format for a DHCP message.
Options include things like the SMTP server option (code 69),
domain name server option (code 6), or NetBIOS over TCP/IP
name server option (code 44). Option code 55 contains the parame-
ter request list or the list of requested options themselves.
According to RFC 2132, the list may be in the client’s order of pref-
erence. Option 43 is reserved for vendor-specific information and
may contain additional vendor-defined options. Options 128
through 254 are reserved for vendor- or site-specific purposes.
By design, a freshly booted DHCP client broadcasts a
DHCPDISCOVER message on the network. In most cases, the
client broadcasts include requests for optional information via
option 55. After the client receives one or more DHCPOFFER mes-
sages, it responds by broadcasting a DHCPREQUEST message that
includes an option indicating which server’s offer is being accepted.
The DHCPREQUEST message may contain optional parameters,
and they may be the same or different from the optional parameters
included in the DHCPDISCOVER message.
A single DHCPDISCOVER or DHCPREQUEST message con-
tains enough information within option 55 alone to accurately finger-
print a remote operating system. Contrast this with the traditional
TCP/IP stack fingerprinting methods used by NMap or p0f where
multiple packets are needed to conclusively identify the remote host.
ANSRdhcp
One of the first features added to KU’s ANSRdhcp server was
the recording of a DHCP client’s last requested options. Recording
the last requested options in a human-readable format has several
advantages. With the delegated administration of the device-centric
data stored in the ANSR directory server, it would be inconvenient
at best for a systems administrator to obtain server-side logging
information or DHCP packet captures to determine which options a
device is requesting.
Systems administrators on KU’s campus can log in to the ANSR
system and look at the options their DHCP clients are requesting
from the central campus ANSRdhcp server. Administrators may
also add the desired responses to these options to ANSR, and the
DHCP server will pass those responses on to the clients the next
time they send a DHCPDISCOVER or DHCPREQUEST message.
The requested options are converted from byte form to the human-
readable directory attribute name. This provides a “fill in the blank”
approach for administrators to ensure that their DHCP clients
receive the settings that they are requesting. The hierarchical struc-
ture of the directory service is used to leverage inheritance of set-
tings, so that common settings can be applied at a parent entry
instead of every client entry.
There are a number of devices on the market that claim they will
only work with a proprietary DHCP server when, in reality, all that
is needed is a way to instruct a DHCP server to provide the proper
response to the device’s request for vendor-specific information.
This is a critical capability that ANSR system possesses, along with
accommodate this, the edge network switches are also registered
devices in the directory. Figure 10 shows an example device entry
that contains the resulting decoded information.
This additional network information can also be used to make
detailed decisions. For example, you may want to provide different
information via DHCP to a test-bench switch on the same subnet as
other switches. The downside to utilizing this option is that the relay
agent information option provides a great deal of information about the
layer-2 physical topology to a potential attacker. An attacker could pas-
sively build a complete map of the edge switch topology, including the
locations of each DHCP client. After this information is injected into
the client’s DHCP request, it is then broadcast visible on the subnet
unless additional precautions are taken.
DHCP Snooping
To prevent the broadcast visibility of DHCP requests and to
enforce additional DHCP controls, Cisco utilizes a configuration
feature called DHCP snooping. Three major benefits of DHCP
snooping include elimination of DHCP broadcast request visibility,
prevention of rogue DHCP servers, and protection against DHCP
server address exhaustion attacks.
DHCP snooping defines a trust model where a port on a switch
is either trusted or not trusted. A trusted port may answer DHCP
requests. If your DHCP server is located on the same subnet, it
must be connected to a trusted port. If however, your DHCP server
is on another subnet and accessible via DHCP relay, the uplink
port of the switch must be trusted. This allows for the DHCP
requests to reach the server. If the port is not trusted, DHCP serv-
ing is not allowed from the port; however, client DHCP requests
may be serviced. Figure 11 shows an example of KU’s DHCP
snooping network topology for the ResNet network.
The configuration needed to enable DHCP snooping is relatively
simple. Figure 12 shows the configuration for an example edge
switch. Interface Fa0/48 is used as the uplink port, and thus must have
Some devices have been found to give out no information via the
optional parameters list. In these cases, DHCPListener fills the oper-
ating system tag with the word “NONE”. In most situations, the
device in question has turned out to be a Linksys broadband router.
ANSRdhcp Fingerprint Integration
The fingerprints.txt file used by DHCPListener is for demonstra-
tion purposes, but the concept may be easily extended into production
DHCP servers. Instead of relying upon a file, the ANSRdhcp server
obtains DHCP fingerprints, as well as other server configuration
options, directly from the directory server that hosts the networked
device information. The dhcpDeviceFingerprint attribute contains a
description and the requested options list in human-readable format. A
visual LDAP browser, like the Softerra LDAP Administrator [7] tool,
may be used to manage DHCP fingerprints as well as all other direc-
tory-hosted information as shown in Figure 7.
DHCP Relay Agent Information Option
When a DHCP client broadcasts a discover message on a subnet,
and a DHCP server is listening on the same subnet, there is minimal
information that the server can use to decide how to service the
request. This information includes the MAC address of the client,
optional client-provided identification information (including a
client identifier and vendor class identifier), and the options that the
client is requesting from the server. The server makes a decision on
how to service the client from this information.
When a DHCP relay is used to forward the request to the DHCP
server, the relay address “giaddr” may also be used to determine how to
service the request. This is implemented by using either a DHCP relay
server or more typically via IP helper functionality on Cisco routers. In
most cases, the relay address acts as a subnet selector to determine
which pool or set of static assignments is appropriate. This may also be
taken a step further into the concept of having a device registered to a
home subnet, and as a registered device, allowed to obtain a lease from
“roaming” pools on other subnets. Using this technique, however, still
does not provide access control granularity beyond the subnet where
the device is attached.
The DHCP relay agent information option as defined in RFC 3046
provides additional information to the DHCP server to make fine-
grained decisions about host configuration. The DHCP relay agent
information option, also known as option 82, is injected into the
DHCP request packets by the network device to which the client is
connected, typically a layer-2 Ethernet switch. Figure 8 shows an out-
line of the Cisco relay agent information option format. Additional
information appended to the request includes the VLAN number, inter-
face index, and the MAC address of the network device itself. From
this information, the server can determine that the request came from
a specific switch on a specific port and knows the active VLAN.
A common use of the relay agent informa-
tion option is to limit the number of unique
MAC addresses that may DHCP boot on a
given network port. More sophisticated imple-
mentations may track the switch and port
information and map it to circuit or jack loca-
tions so that hosts may be located quickly for
security or help-desk reasons.
Figure 9 shows how inbound discover
packets are processed, and the information
that is recorded from the request directly
into the device’s directory server entry. Note
that the IP address of the network switch
must be resolved via the MAC address. To
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Figure 7  ANSRdhcp server configuration
Figure 8  Cisco relay agent information option
ip dhcp snooping trust enabled. All other 47 client connection ports
are not trusted and are also configured with a limit rate of 30 DHCP
packets per second to suppress DHCP server denial of service attacks.
Note that you may need to upgrade your Cisco IOS image on these
switches to support these relatively new features. The IOS revision
that KU used is also shown in Figure 12.
The router configuration in Figure 13 shows the configuration
options that must be added to each VLAN that uses the DHCP
snooping model. First, the address of the DHCP server is specified
as the ip helper-address. Second, the ip dhcp relay information
trusted option must be set. This ensures that DHCP traffic will be
relayed to only the DHCP server and that the server specified may
receive the additional relay agent information option.
Because a port must be trusted to be a DHCP server, the threat of
rogue DHCP servers is eliminated. KU had previously experienced
numerous ResNet customer service outages due to wireless broad-
band routers being connected to their internal network interfaces
instead of the WAN ports. These improperly connected broadband
routers then handed out RFC 1918 [8] local addresses to other clients
instead of proper ResNet addresses. This feature of DHCP snooping
alone has saved countless hours of customer service headaches.
Cisco’s DHCP snooping implementation also allows for limit-
ing the rate of DHCP requests per port, per second. This greatly
reduces the amount of traffic generated by a DHCP server address
exhaustion attack, preventing denial of service against the DHCP
server. In combination with a packet throttle built into the DHCP
server, DHCP snooping has prevented DHCP service outages.
DHCP Lease Query
A DHCP server contains authoritative information regarding the
mapping of MAC addresses to IP addresses. This information can be
critical for tracking network usage in a layer-3 routed environment
where a client may roam across subnets. The IETF draft for DHCP
lease query, draft-ietf-dhc-leasequery-07.txt, defines how DHCP lease
query performs the lookup and has already been successfully pre-stan-
dard implemented by some vendors, including Ellacoya Networks[9].
Other uses for this information mapping include passive authen-
tication through layer-3 gateways such that only hosts registered in
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Figure 9  ANSRdhcp request recording logic
Figure 10  ANSR device entry
Figure 11  DHCP snooping network topology
Cisco Catalyst 2950G 48
C2950-I6K2L2Q4-M, Version 12.1(22)EA1
ip dhcp snooping vlan 123
ip dhcp snooping
interface FastEthernet0/1-47
switchport access vlan 123
switchport mode access
ip dhcp snooping limit rate 30
interface FastEthernet0/48
switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q
switchport trunk allowed vlan 123
switchport mode trunk
ip dhcp snooping trust
Figure 12  Edge network switch configuration
tion is available on the Internet at: http://www.nts.ku.edu/ \
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the DHCP server may pass traffic through a layer-3 boundary, per-
haps through a border router to the Internet. This also allows for
Internet usage billing and policy application at a granular level. For
example, some hosts in the DHCP server may be allowed to pass
peer-to-peer traffic while others may not.
Gateway devices often maintain the policy information and
grouping constructs for policy application. The gateway device uti-
lizes unicast DHCP lease query messages to resolve layer-2 MAC
addresses to layer-3 IP address mapping information.
When using a DHCP server with lease query support, the server
should be configured to answer lease queries only from trusted
sources (i.e., the gateway devices). Otherwise, an attacker could
mine the complete layer-2 to layer-3 map of your network through
remote unicast packets. This is the equivalent of remotely obtaining
a complete ARP table.
Figure 14 shows the flow of inbound DHCP packets through the
lease query packet filter. If the lease query request originated from an
authorized host, as specified in the directory server configuration
dhcpAuthorizedLeaseQueryHost attribute, then the lease query will be
processed. If the requester is not authorized, the packet is discarded.
The ANSR directory server is then searched by IP address for corre-
sponding registered device entry. If the entry is found, a lease query
response is generated containing the device’s MAC address and lease
time remaining. Otherwise, if the host is not found, a response is gen-
erated that does not contain any device-specific information indicating
that a device registered to the requested IP address was not found.
The network location of your DHCP server is also critical to a
secure DHCP server deployment. If the DHCP server is located on the
same subnet it services, the server may be more vulnerable to local
subnet ARP style redirect and spoofing attacks to obtain this informa-
tion. For this reason, it is good practice to place the DHCP server on a
separate segment where it does not answer local DHCP requests; only
those obtained via specified trusted relay addresses are answered.
Conclusion
Systems administrators in large environments have welcomed
DHCP and with good reason; it has cured countless headaches
caused by having to resolve IP conflicts and has enabled the era of
mobile computing.
However, as with any technology, DHCP has brought new secu-
rity challenges. Unforeseen uses of DHCP, including passively fin-
gerprinting remote operating systems and passively mapping the
entire network, require DHCP administrators to carefully consider
their implementations. Hardware vendors should include features
like Cisco’s DHCP snooping in order to mitigate information leaks
and denial of service attacks in next generation DHCP deployments.
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Cisco Catalyst 6509
interface Vlan123
description DHCP Snooping Example
ip helper-address 10.1.1.2
ip dhcp relay information trusted
Figure 13  Router configuration
Figure 14  ANSRdhcp lease query support
